FIPS implementation progress
Status: experimental implementation; local UDP roundtrip exercised, deployment and interoperability verification pending. This record distinguishes existing code from the intended design.
Active next phases
The owner-approved next increment is now the owner-setup and app-invitation revision, coordinated with core C3 and Teams Todo R0–R7. Existing F1–F3 code/local evidence does not establish those new features or successful deployed synchronization.
The app-access and messaging record owns F1 soft grants / protocol routing, F2 binary/text messaging, and F3 health/recovery. Their code is implemented with local checks; real network/UI acceptance remains open. The user authorized completing all implementations together, without a compatibility bridge. See the core record and Teams Todo MVP record.
The numbered phases below are historical progress categories, not the new execution order. Existing checked items remain evidence of their original scope. New app permissions are unsigned, owner-managed DB records; signed FIPS pairing is unchanged. Use protocol/topic terminology for new app messages. Subscriptions, publication fan-out and project membership belong to consumer apps, not FIPS.
Present implementation
- Dedicated plugin identity and encrypted local key storage.
- Manual JSON invite import/export and local peer roster.
- Shared outbound
peer-network:v1and inboundpeer-channel:v1contracts. - Custom UDP transport, encrypted Nostr signaling, and ping command.
- One-off roundtrip over real loopback UDP with substitute in-memory signaling.
- Document FIPS layers, current relay selection, app boundaries, and gaps.
- Add networking glossary, current kind
37195example, and diagnostics inventory.
Remaining work
Instance identity and web management
- Migrate legacy unique-master peer tables without losing peer IDs or data; retain unique FIPS keys and permit multiple instances owned by one master.
- Allow signed same-master pairing between distinct FIPS identities; retain self-instance rejection and authenticated owner binding.
- Reject ambiguous master-only delivery rather than select an arbitrary instance.
- Replace the web list with instance trees, expanded identity details, Invite / Add code / Refresh controls, and per-instance Ping / Remove actions.
- Add local display aliases during pairing and an instance-specific Rename alias form; preserve aliases when the same instance is paired again.
- Run targeted ESLint, TypeScript and narrowly scoped in-memory checks; no automated test suite or authenticated browser checks unless requested.
- Verify migration and management/signing flows in the deployed local/VPS UI.
Verification: targeted ESLint (--fix), plugin generation and whitespace checks
passed. In-memory checks covered legacy migration/idempotence, preserved peer
IDs/data/indexes/triggers, multiple same-owner instances, correct UPSERT identity,
ambiguous master-only delivery, signed same-master pairing, self-instance and
owner-rebinding rejection, one-time completion, alias trimming/validation/rename,
alias and seed preservation on re-pairing, web schema/control/action validity and
updated removal output. No real database or relay was used. TypeScript reports
only the three previously documented vendored Noble/WebRTC errors, with none in
the changed plugin code. Deployment/UI and live connectivity remain unverified.
Phase 1 — signed manual pairing (implemented; deployment verification pending)
- Required signaling relay and optional recipient master-key inputs.
- Master-signed versioned invitation with unique ID, expiry, and FIPS binding.
- Verified identity preview followed by explicit signing/acceptance consent.
- Signed acceptance referencing the original invite and inheriting its relay.
- Durable outgoing/incoming state, atomic one-time completion, and duplicate rejection.
- Persist relay subscriptions and check advert publication before returning codes.
- Remove unsigned invite/manual-key pairing bypasses from the public commands.
- Document the pairing flow and boundaries.
- Isolated in-memory check: signed exchange, both rosters, recipient binding, duplicate completion rejection, and signature-tampering rejection.
- User verified signed invite/acceptance exchange through the UI with both instances reporting one configured peer (relay advert acceptance required).
- Verify real-relay traversal signaling and encrypted ping between the instances.
- Correct signing preview block layout and render callback codes/errors as rich results with a Copy code action (plain-text callback output is suppressed).
- One-off schema verification of block rows, full code, copy payload, and error result; targeted ESLint passed. User subsequently confirmed copying both codes and completing pairing.
- Add cancellation/code-recovery UI and clean up expired invitation records.
The ping form's invalid number field kind was corrected to integer after a
user-reported save_timeline_form failure. This failure happened before transport
execution. Plugin TypeScript checking previously also reported three vendor
errors: core identity references Noble's removed ProjectivePoint, and two WebRTC
calls pass strings where Noble v2 requires bytes. Those vendor errors remain
unresolved. Transport hardening below remains unimplemented.
Phase 2 — bounded and authenticated connection establishment
- Fix ping lifecycle: immediately handled failure, separate connection/send/pong deadlines, cleanup on failure/restart, and expected-peer pong matching.
- Isolated one-off lifecycle check: connection/send/pong timeouts, immediate and late failures, fast pong, restart cancellation, pending-map cleanup, and zero unhandled rejections. Targeted ESLint passed; TypeScript checking reports only the three existing vendor errors above.
- Verify the timeout fix between running paired instances. Per-attempt transport abort and finer relay/STUN/punch/handshake diagnostics remain follow-ups.
- Enforce signaling schemas, sender/recipient/session binding, expiry and replay limits.
- Bound event sizes, concurrent attempts, sockets, timers, and retained replay state.
- Validate candidate destinations; prevent arbitrary probing/reflection and unauthenticated endpoint changes.
- Rate-limit before expensive processing and after authenticated peer identification.
- Immediate session/attempt cancellation when a peer is blocked or removed.
Phase 3 — application isolation and operations
- Selective protocol routing, bounded payloads/rates and soft app grants (F1/F2); project authorization remains with the consumer app.
- Document that pairing grants no shell/filesystem access or blanket app permission.
- Stage-specific diagnostics and bounded failure history without logging secret payloads.
- Real-relay, separate-network, malformed-input and resource-exhaustion verification before untrusted deployment.
Connectivity follow-ups
- Add temporary bounded UDP probe error-code, callback/throw source, candidate-index and address-scope diagnostics without changing abort behavior; log unattributed socket error codes separately without endpoint details.
- User captured a real cross-network attempt: offer/answer matched, then VPS
send callback reported
ECONNREFUSEDassociated with a private candidate and aborted punching; local punching timed out. Exact ICMP destination and viability of the public candidate remain unverified. - Targeted ESLint (
--fix) and plugin diff whitespace checks passed for the temporary UDP diagnostics. No tests or live traversal were run for this patch. - Continue bounded all-candidate retries after classified destination/network errors; retain conservative aborts for unknown errors/socket closure and guard late callbacks. Preserve detailed diagnostics with bounded repeated warnings, candidate scope inventory, continue/abort decisions and final summaries.
- Targeted ESLint (
--fix) and diff whitespace checks passed for bounded UDP retry handling. TypeScript reports only the same three documented vendor errors, none in the changed transport. No tests or live traversal were run. - Verify both directions on local/VPS after the retry change, including continued attempts after refused sends, timeout behavior, encrypted ping and restart recovery. Cross-network success and the keepalive workaround remain separate deployment checks; no UDP firewall/privilege changes are included.
- Add correlated subscription/offer/answer/STUN/punch diagnostics and bounded, checked signaling publication; make receive/rejection failures visible.
- Correct obsolete WebSocket-seed requirement and peer-list block layout.
- Observe answer/punch rejections before publication awaits; clear failed answer waiters and stop punch timers/listeners when their socket closes.
- Match answers to the expected authenticated signer and require the offered compressed FIPS key to match its roster entry.
- Isolated publication check: partial success, all rejected, acknowledgement timeout, correlated logging, redaction, and zero unhandled rejections.
- Targeted ESLint and plugin diff whitespace checks passed. TypeScript reports only the three previously documented vendor errors; no new diagnostic-code errors. No production relay publication or authenticated UI check was run.
- Verify correlated logs and signaling delivery between the real paired instances.
- Fetch and validate peer kind
37195adverts. Explicit invitation relays and checked advert publication are implemented; kind10050remains deferred. - Wire sanitized transport/core logging and inspect signaling publication results; expose stage-specific nested failures and subscription callback diagnostics.
- Add per-relay subscription recovery and connection health (F3).
- Add persistent diagnostic history/UI beyond current bounded logs and status.
- Validate signaling schemas, sender/recipient bindings, freshness, and replay windows; bound retained sessions and concurrent traversal attempts.
- Review candidate address policy, endpoint changes, socket error handling, timeout cleanup, simultaneous dials, and restart/reconnect behavior.
- Migrate legacy unique-master schemas and select explicit instances for web management/ping; reject ambiguous master-only sends.
- Extend the app-facing send contract with an explicit instance destination for a master identity with multiple FIPS endpoints.
- Implement authenticated-evidence connection health (F3); deployed verification pending.
- Implement automatic carrier fallback.
- Define selective inbound protocol routing and precise single-peer send semantics (F1/F2); durable app acknowledgements remain consumer-owned.
- Verify signaling through real relays and traversal across separate networks.
- Verify interoperability against a pinned Rust implementation/version.
Application-specific sync/merge, storage-engine selection, and bunker-backed application signing remain separate work owned by consumer apps or signing services. They are not transport-plugin exit criteria.